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I.

INTRODUCTION

I
O
W
I

t is not widely known that the largest, longest-running military action of
the American Revolutionary War was a siege that did not take place in the
territory of the future United States.1 It did not take place in the Western
Hemisphere, it was not led by an American general, and it did not involve
forces of the American Continental Army.2 The distinction belongs to the
1779 siege of Gibraltar at the western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.3
Eager to avenge and reverse losses of colonial territory, France and Spain
recognized American independence and entered the war with Great Britain
in 1778 and 1779, respectively.4 Both continental powers provided significant arms and financial support to the Americans throughout the conflict.
Both also engaged in pitched battles with the British, none as storied as the
epic 1,323-day siege of the British Gibraltar garrison.5
The siege began in September of 1779 when Spain launched a naval
blockade against the British-held outpost. Although he fielded considerable
troops and artillery, the Spanish commander resolved to starve rather than
to assault the formidable British garrison.6 Through October, the Spanish
force effectively prevented any major resupply by land or sea.7 By the winter
of 1779, the garrison’s food and cooking fuels ran short. 8 Scurvy set in
1. ROY ADKINS & LESLIE ADKINS, GIBRALTAR: THE GREATEST SIEGE IN BRITISH
HISTORY 335–38 (2017).
2. During the American Revolutionary War, John Jay, in his capacity as Minister
Plenipotentiary to the Court of Spain, sent the Virginian, Louis Littlepage to Spain,
who reportedly observed a portion of the siege of Gibraltar from a Spanish gunboat.
See Virginia Johnson, General Lewis Littlepage: Soldier, Spy, and King’s Confidant, 1762–1802,
LIBRARY POINT (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.librarypoint.org/blogs/post/lewis-littlepage/
(citing CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS, THE KING’S CHEVALIER: A BIOGRAPHY OF LEWIS
LITTLEPAGE (1961)). Although Littlepage later became a general, he did not attend the
Gibraltar siege in that capacity or command American military forces there. Id.
3. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 10.
4. Whether the war between Spain and France on one hand and the British on the other
is best characterized as a feature of the American Revolution or a separate armed conflict is
a matter of perspective. Hostilities between these European belligerents, of course, preceded
the American conflict, most immediately in the Seven Years War from 1756 to 1763.
5. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 4.
6. SAMUEL ANCELL, A CIRCUMSTANTIAL JOURNAL OF THE LONG AND TEDIOUS
BLOCKADE AND SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR FROM THE 12TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1779 TO THE 23RD
DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1782, at 9 (Liverpool, Charles Wosencroft 1784).
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 20.
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among the besieged British soldiers and food rationing extended to civilians,
including spouses and children trapped with the garrison.9
On January 17, 1780, the tide of the siege briefly turned when a relief
fleet dispatched from England ran the Spanish blockade.10 Warships and
supply boats poured soldiers and provisions into the garrison through early
February 1780.11 The convoy saved the garrison from near-certain surrender.12 On the relief fleet’s departure, however, the siege resumed and extended into summer. Within weeks, physical isolation reduced the garrison
to subsistence on salted meat and exorbitantly priced supplies smuggled
through the blockade by North African, Portuguese, and even Spanish merchants.13 By autumn, the defenders mounted civilian evacuations on perilous
runs through the blockade to reduce demand on dwindling supplies.14 When
the besiegers intercepted these efforts, they forced those captured to return
to Gibraltar.15 By the second winter of the siege, deprivation and disease
again tormented the defenders and remaining civilians. Desertions mounted
among the British force as provisions dwindled and hopelessness set in.16 By
April 1781 Spanish advances finally brought the British garrison into effective artillery range, and the succeeding bombardment inflicted horrendous
casualties and damage.17
In response, London dispatched a second relief fleet.18 Twenty-nine
ships of the line escorted one hundred supply transports into Gibraltar’s
port, again saving the garrison.19 The relief fleet withdrew with the majority
of Gibraltar’s one thousand civilians aboard, greatly extending the remaining
defenders’ capability to resist starvation. By late 1781 and early 1782, the
British depended on Portuguese merchant ships regularly running the Spanish blockade to provide food, as well as intelligence on the surrounding
force.20 In conjunction with British raiding sorties against the Spanish siege
9. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 155–61.
10. ANCELL supra note 6, at 29–30; ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 108–13.
11. ANCELL supra note 6, at 36.
12. F. J. STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF GIBRALTAR AND ITS SIEGES 257 (London,
Provost 1870).
13. ANCELL supra note 6, at 38–50; STEPHENS, supra note 12, at 259.
14. ANCELL supra note 6, at 66, 68–69.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 93, 96, 97, 99, 104, 125, 161.
17. Id. at 124.
18. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 185–88.
19. Id.; STEPHENS, supra note 12, at 261.
20. ANCELL supra note 6, at 163, 192, 195–96, 199.
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works, their support extended the siege significantly.21 Still, a passage from
the letters of a British officer captures the intensity of the besieged population’s suffering:
[Y]ou find Death busy—the lamp of life faintly burns—your friends are
absent—the foe shews no tenderness—you sigh, weep, groan, pray, beg,
intreat, and in the bitter agonies implore Almighty god to be merciful to a
poor sinner—life hangs on a hair—the cordage of your heart cracks, and
you drop into an unknown world where the secrets of all hearts are disclosed.22

Through the history of warfare, human suffering has seldom been more
dire than during sieges. Although bombings, envelopments, and other forms
of maneuver often deprive civilian populations of life-sustaining support, no
military operation does so as drastically, as deliberately, or as systematically
as siege. Sieges attempt to achieve through sequestration and deprivation
what might otherwise require enormously costly assaults or bombardments.
By their very nature, sieges involve a stark, deliberate, and sustained conflict
between the interests of humanity and military necessity. The military imperative of effecting and maintaining complete physical, psychological, and, in
modern operations, electronic isolation clashes directly with the basic humanitarian needs of civilian populations trapped with besieged forces. It is
unsurprising that sieges have produced some of war’s harshest and most
tragic tales of human suffering.
A comparably harsh legal regime has accompanied siege. Formerly,
sieges licensed merciless looting and killing of defeated military forces and
civilian populations alike.23 While the practice of pillage is no longer lawful,
modern siege law still tolerates deliberate infliction of extreme deprivation.
Besieging forces have also been free to reject passages of humanitarian relief
without explanation. States have consented to restraints on their prerogative
to deny offers of relief under only the narrowest conditions.24 While all law
of war rules and principles reflect a balance between humanity and military
21. Id. at 172–79.
22. Id. at 101.
23. JOSH LEVITHAN, ROMAN SIEGE WARFARE 205 (2013) (describing “thorough
plunder” as the primary activity of the post-siege setting in Roman war); Geoffrey Parker,
Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 48 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994);
MAURICE KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 120–22 (1965).
24. See infra text accompanying note 135.
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necessity, few skew so drastically to the former as the law of siege. At a time
when legal vindication of humanitarian interests during war is ascendant, the
conventional law of siege may seem an outlier full of glaring gaps in logic.
Since 2013, organs of the United Nations (UN) have consistently deplored conditions endured by civilians trapped by armed conflicts, especially
by siege operations in Syria.25 The UN Security Council has specifically condemned the belligerent parties’ unwillingness to permit or facilitate delivery
of humanitarian aid to besieged populations.26 Moved by rampant human
suffering among encircled and isolated civilians, the UN commissioned experts to report on legal issues associated with humanitarian relief operations.
Two Oxford University professors and a consulting group of legal experts
studied and analyzed belligerent parties’ obligations toward relief actions under international law. Their report combines incontrovertible descriptive
truths of human suffering with clever legal interpretations and laudable humanitarian aspirations. Where conventional accounts of the law of siege have
portrayed a consent-based system in which belligerents may, for the most
part, freely agree to or reject offers of relief,27 the Oxford Guidance depicts a
regime wherein States may not arbitrarily reject relief actions and must offer
reasoned justifications for turning away offers of humanitarian assistance to
besieged populations.28
25. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2401 (Feb. 24, 2018); S.C. Res. 2328 (Dec. 19, 2016); U.N.
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution
2139 (2014), ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. S/2014/208 (Mar. 24, 2014).
26. S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013); S.C. Res. 2043 (Apr.
21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2042 (Apr. 14, 2012).
27. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT ¶ 9.12.1 (2004) [hereinafter UK LOAC MANUAL] (emphasizing that relief to
besieged areas is contingent on belligerent consent); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 44a (1956) [hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE] (“The commander of the investing force has the right to forbid all communications and access between the besieged place and the outside.”). But see OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.20.1
(rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] ( “States . . . should not arbitrarily withhold consent.”) (emphasis added); Cedric Ryngaert, Humanitarian Assistance and
the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective, 5 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 4, 5 (Spring 2013)
(observing ab initio “without consent, humanitarian actors cannot provide relief” and “a
combination of . . . different legal principles may yield the rule that states may indeed refuse
consent, but not for arbitrary or capricious reasons.”) (first emphasis added).
28. DAPO AKANDE & EMANUELA-CHARA GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE
LAW RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT (2016) [hereinafter OXFORD GUIDANCE].
5
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The Oxford Guidance surely illustrates the potential for law and lawyers to
alleviate human suffering. It addresses persistent logical shortcomings of the
law and presents a compelling example of how humanitarian logic—reasoned resolutions of legal interpretive dilemmas undertaken to vindicate human welfare—can inform, and perhaps improve, treaty interpretation and
the balance between humanity and military necessity.
But is law of war interpretation simply a matter of applying humanitarian
logic? The law of war attends carefully to humanity, including rules applicable to relief operations. These rules, when observed, humanize armed conflict and reduce unnecessary suffering in war. Yet careful law of war study
reveals that no rule is maximally protective—none extends to the full logical
limits of human welfare. Each rule concedes, as it must, to concerns of sovereignty, practicality, and military necessity. As the conventional account
maintains, nearly every law of war duty with respect to humanitarian relief is
conditioned on the consent of belligerents. Accounts of law of war doctrine
require meticulous attention to the conditions and requirements of combat
operations. Careful and deliberate consideration of military necessity—the
operational imperatives for effective and successful prosecution of war—
have proved an essential component of law of war formation and, therefore,
of its interpretation and implementation.
Considering its compelling subject, the source of its mandate, and the
stature of the institution that produced it, a careful examination of the Oxford
Guidance from both doctrinal and operational perspectives is essential. Many
will find its interpretive attention to results that relieve human suffering a
commendable example of progressive, purposive analysis. Yet closer examination reveals an interpretation that inexorably prioritizes humanitarian purposes over plain reading and State intent to support logically appealing,
though doctrinally, historically, and operationally troubling conclusions.
Experience with siege operations suggests the Oxford Guidance undervalues the role that the military imperative of isolating besieged forces played
in the formation of the law. Siege operations past and present—perhaps the
epitome of conflict between humanitarian need and military necessity—
merit thorough consideration in any account of the law of relief actions.
While perhaps out of synch with modern sensibilities toward human suffering, the conventional law of siege may be justified in light of military experience with siege. In its results and methods, the Oxford Guidance underappreciates how these experiences informed the balance between humanity and
military necessity struck by the States that codified the law of war applicable
to relief actions. While the humanitarian logic and regulatory aspirations of
6
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the Oxford Guidance are admirable, military logic and military imperatives require equally deliberate attention in formulating the international law regulating the critical matter of humanitarian relief during armed conflict. It is a
worthy example of humanitarian logic, but the Oxford Guidance effects revisions and legal evolutions better left to formal international law processes
that involve States directly.
II.

ISOLATION: THE MILITARY IMPERATIVE OF SIEGE

Modern military doctrine increasingly avoids the term siege in favor of the
broader notion of encirclement.29 Yet this adjustment to military semantics
should not be understood to imply obsolescence. A survey of modern armed
conflict reveals sieges to be essential, if operationally undesirable, military
actions.30 The demographics of urbanization and the evolution of warfare
from contests over territory to contests for control of populations and human capital suggest continued, or even increased, resort to sieges and other
operations that entrap or isolate civilian populations. During the last three
decades, highly organized, well-equipped, and capable armed forces have
been drawn into or resorted to siege operations in several armed conflicts
including Lebanon,31 Chechnya,32 Bosnia,33 Iraq,34 and Syria,35 while siegelike conditions quickly developed in Yemen.36 More than mere contests of
29. Lionel M. Beehner, Benedetta Berti & Michael T. Jackson, The Strategic Logic of Sieges
in Counterinsurgencies, 47 PARAMETERS 77, 77 (Summer 2017).
30. See, e.g., HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-06, URBAN OPERATIONS ¶ 6-31 (2006) [hereinafter URBAN OPERATIONS] (cautioning military leaders to
avoid attrition tactics during urban operations).
31. See id. appendix A (providing military doctrinal analysis of the Israeli siege of West
Beirut); see also George W. Gawrych, The Siege of Beirut, in BLOCK BY BLOCK: THE CHALLENGES OF URBAN OPERATIONS 205 (William G. Robertson ed., 2003) [hereinafter BLOCK
BY BLOCK]; RASHID KHALIDI, UNDER SIEGE: P.L.O. DECISIONMAKING DURING THE 1982
WAR 43–66 (1986) (describing the military situation giving rise to the 1982 siege of West
Beirut); David Koff, Chronology of the War in Lebanon, September–November, 1983, 13 JOURNAL
OF PALESTINE STUDIES 127 (1984) (compiling and chronicling events during the late stages
of the Israeli siege of West Beirut).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 50–54.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 55–90.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 102–04.
36. See, e.g., Key Facts about the War in Yemen, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 25, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.
html. Rebel Houthi forces have placed portions of the city of Taiz under siege, preventing
delivery of medical supplies and food to an entrapped civilian population. Id. See also Nasser
7
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willpower, sieges have proved keen tests of applied military doctrine, leadership, and combat effectiveness.
Military tacticians and strategists insist that sealing off encircled forces
from lines of operation, communication, and logistical support are supremely important during siege.37 Indeed, control of access to a besieged area
is the sine qua non of siege.38 A U.S. Army field manual identifies physical,
psychological, and electronic facets to isolation.39 Each is essential to success
in modern siege operations. Physical isolation is easily understood and the
most widely practiced form of isolation during sieges. It is the key to material
attrition efforts, denying both logistical resupply and reinforcement to the
besieged force.40 Physical isolation also diverts the efforts of the besieged
force from defending against assault to countering the effects of deprivation
imposed by isolation.41 Psychological isolation describes separation of the
besieged force from outside political and moral support to reduce the will to
resist.42 Information and deception operations are important aspects of psychological isolation to impose a sense of hopelessness on the besieged
force.43 Finally, electronic isolation has emerged as a critical aspect of modern siege operations.44 Network and electronic attacks reduce the besieged
force’s capacity to plan and coordinate its defense. Electronic isolation also
deprives the besieged force of critical outside intelligence sources. In combination, these three facets of isolation have proved decisive during siege
operations.45
Al-Sakkaf, Yemen’s Displaced in Dire Need of Food, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/yemen-displaced-dire-food-16021
5115827332.html.
37. 2 HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-90-2, RECONNAISSANCE, SECURITY, AND TACTICAL ENABLING TASKS 6-1–6-3 (2013) (instructing
forces to isolate enemy forces during encirclement operations); URBAN OPERATIONS,
supra note 30, ¶¶ 6–11, 7–54 (observing “Isolation is essential.”).
38. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 78. The authors define siege as “any
attempt by an adversary to control access into and out of a town, neighborhood, or other
terrain of strategic significance to achieve a military or political objective.” Id. This definition
omits the element of an entrapped enemy force.
39. URBAN OPERATIONS, supra note 30, ¶¶ 6-11–14.
40. Id. ¶ 6-12.
41. Id. ¶ 7-56.
42. Id. ¶ 6-14.
43. Id.
44. Id. ¶ 6-13.
45. Id. ¶ 7-54 (“One key to success in the history of urban operations has been the
effective isolation of the threat force.”).
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History repeatedly confirms the imperative of absolute isolation to successful sieges. In the Second World War, German forces rapidly enveloped
the Soviet city of Leningrad in September 1941.46 When a determined defense repulsed a final large-scale assault on the city, the Germans reverted to
attrition tactics to bring the besieged Russians to submission. Mass starvation
resulted. Within a matter of months, thousands of civilians died daily.47 Yet
heroic determination—as well as dwindling German forces diverted to support offensive operations in southern and central Russia—permitted the
Russians to keep narrow lines of resupply open. The siege lasted nearly threeand-a-half years, until it was broken in January 1944.48 Ultimately, the Germans’ failure to fully isolate Leningrad from outside support, especially via a
lake frozen in winter months, is credited with both prolonging the siege and
saving the city’s inhabitants from total starvation (although as many as a million civilians may have died).49
Five decades later, Russian experience, this time as a besieging rather
than a besieged force, confirmed the lesson of Leningrad. The Second Chechen War from 1999 to 2000 included a five-month siege of the city of
Grozny.50 The Russians were determined to avenge a defeat in the 1994–95
First Chechen War, during which poorly led and poorly organized Russian
forces never fully isolated Chechen forces defending Grozny and ultimately
were repulsed.51 A Russian after-action review of the first effort cited the
inability to seal borders as a contributing factor to failure.52 Likewise, a Russian military journal advised that in future operations built up areas must be
“unexpectedly, quickly, and completely” sealed off.”53
46. PAUL K. DAVIS, BESIEGED: 100 GREAT SIEGES FROM JERICHO TO SARAJEVO
314 (2003). See also HARRISON SALISBURY, THE 900 DAYS (1969).
47. DAVIS, supra note 46, at 314.
48. Id. at 311, 315.
49. Id. at 315.
50. Timothy L. Thomas, The 31 December 1994–8 February 1995 Battle for Grozny, in
BLOCK BY BLOCK, supra note 31, at 161. Incidentally, Grozny translates as “terrible” or
“formidable.” Id.
51. DAVIS, supra note 46, at 360–63; Thomas, supra note 50, at 161 (chronicling Russian
urban combat operations); Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for
Urban Combat, 29 PARAMETERS 87 (Summer 1999); Raymond C. Finch III, Why the
Russian Military Failed in Chechnya 7, 12 (Foreign Military Studies Office, Center for Army
Lessons Learned, Paper No. 98-16, 1998).
52. Thomas, supra note 50, at 173 (indicating the Russian force did not seal the town
until January 15, 1995, nearly a month -and-a half into the siege).
53. Id. (citing Oleg Namsarayev, Sweeping Built Up Areas, ARMEYSKIY SBORNIK (Apr.
1995)).
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In their second attempt, as with their first, Russian forces resorted to
extensive and indiscriminate bombardment, reducing the city almost entirely
to rubble. Indeed, the Grozny campaigns are nearly synonymous with urban
tactics of devastation. However, an important and overlooked facet of the
1999 victory was the Russian commander’s complete blockade of the city
from outside support, including humanitarian aid.54 Isolation, as much as
willingness to resort to overwhelming (and almost certainly unlawful) force,
cured the failures of the Russians’ previous effort to take Grozny by siege.
Contemporaneously with the Chechen wars, the lesson of maintaining
isolation during siege was made acutely clear in the Balkans. In April 1992,
ethnic Serb forces of Bosnian nationality, supported by Serbia, laid siege to
the Bosnia-Herzegovinian (Bosnian) city of Sarajevo.55 The Serbs’ objective
was to bisect the city and to force capitulation of the Bosnian government
in order to form a breakaway Serb state.56
The Serbs enjoyed overwhelmingly superior military forces and tactical
positions.57 A UN arms embargo on both belligerent parties practically sealed
this advantage.58 Initial estimates predicted a quick victory for the Serbs.59
Yet the siege dragged on for over three years, resulting in one of the longest
sieges in modern warfare.60 Among many reasons for the siege’s duration
was the Serbs’ inability to isolate the city physically and psychologically. Alt-

54. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 84.
55. OFFICE OF RUSSIAN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ANALYSIS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT, 1990–1995, at 152–53 (2002) [hereinafter BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS].
56. PETER ANDREAS, BLUE HELMETS AND BLACK MARKETS: THE BUSINESS OF
SURVIVAL IN THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO 26–27 (2008).
57. See Curtis King, The Siege of Sarajevo, 1992–1995, in BLOCK BY BLOCK, supra note
31, at 235, 246 (describing Serb control of high ground surrounding Sarajevo); see also
BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 154, 308.
58. S.C. Res. 757, ¶¶ 4–5 (May 27, 1992); S.C. Res. 713, ¶ 6 (Sept. 25, 1991); King,
supra note 57, at 254 (noting the Bosnians initially lacked an external weapons benefactor
such as Serbia was for the Bosnian Serbs).
59. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 25; TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH, AND
THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 194 (2000); JOHN FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER,
THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF EMERGENCY PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF USAIDS
OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1991–
1996) 15 (2000).
60. BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 307.
10
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hough Serbian armed forces encircled the city quickly, their lines proved porous, permitting frequent resupplies of the besieged Bosnian forces and the
civilian population trapped with them.
The Serbs failed not only to seal Sarajevo from belligerent Bosnian support; they also failed to seal the city from international actors. The siege provoked, and the Serbs ultimately consented to, enormous international and
UN aid efforts, including a costly airlift.61 By 1995, a UN force of five thousand persons worked from Sarajevo to protect and deliver humanitarian
aid.62 One estimate indicates that as many as two hundred non-governmental
organizations also provided humanitarian relief to Sarajevo.63
Further, one scholar concluded that international involvement perpetuated, rather than terminated, the siege.64 In fact, for many actors, including
members of the UN protection force, the delivery of humanitarian aid and
black-market smuggling may have overshadowed the military aspects of the
siege.65 It has been observed with more than a little irony that Sarajevo, host
to the 1984 Winter Olympics, only became a globally connected city after it
was besieged.66
By agreement between the parties, Serb officials supervised the manifests
and cargo lists of all in-bound flights.67 They even secured a concession that
nearly a quarter of the aid delivered be diverted to their own besieging
forces.68 A further thirty percent of aid deliveries, especially those arriving by
land, are estimated to have been skimmed off by criminal elements and black
marketers.69 Still, the Serbs were unable to prevent UN-delivered humanitarian aid intended for the civilian population from being diverted to the Bosnian defenders.70 An aid monitor for the UN estimated that more than
twenty percent of aid went directly to the defending Bosnian armed forces.71

61. Id.
62. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 7.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., id. at ix; BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 308.
65. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at x, 9.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 43.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 45.
11
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The UN High Commissioner for Refugees publicly denied that aid supported belligerents, but is reported to have privately acknowledged diversion
and skimming as the price of humanitarian access to Sarajevo.72
The Serb efforts to seal the city, admittedly at times half-hearted, were
further compromised by the purportedly neutral UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). According to one account, UNPROFOR convoys regularly
charged fees to smuggle Bosnian civilians out of the city in armored personnel carriers.73 UNPROFOR members also arranged for seats for wealthy or
well-connected civilians on departing flights and UN forces permitted military material, including decisive anti-tank missiles, ammunition, and communications equipment, to cross the airport tarmac at the edge of the Serb perimeter into Sarajevo.74 Meanwhile, Ukrainian and Egyptian troops notoriously sold off their rations and fuel to Bosnian fighters.75 Members of highlevel governmental delegations reportedly loaded baggage with contraband
bound for the black market, including a five-member delegation that arrived
with forty suitcases.76 Perhaps most significantly, UN officials turned a blind
eye to an eight-hundred meter tunnel, a “public secret” complete with rails,
which delivered millions of pounds of supplies to the city and its defending
forces.77 When Serbs shelled the tunnel’s exit, the UN threatened a NATO
response.78
NATO intervention later materialized in response to a Serb mortar attack on a Sarajevo market for smuggled goods.79 NATO air strikes dropped
more than one thousand bombs on Serb positions outside Sarajevo and elsewhere.80 The attacks shifted the military balance and forced the Serbs to confront the prospect of broader international intervention. Perhaps more significantly, the NATO campaign emboldened the Bosnian Army, encouraging and facilitating offensives in the countryside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Weapons smuggled past the UN embargoes, often by humanitarian front
agencies, were critical to arming the Bosnian offensives and shifting the military balance around Sarajevo.81 By late 1995, the nationalist Serb movement
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. at 47.
74. Id. at 54.
75. Id. at 47.
76. Id. at 49.
77. Id. at 62; King, supra note 57, at 244, 268.
78. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 59–60.
79. King, supra note 57, at 272.
80. Id.
81. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 109, 111.
12
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consented to talks that culminated in a negotiated end to the siege and the
broader conflict.
The Serbs’ precise goals for the siege remain unclear and likely evolved
as the situation developed. Although submission of Bosnian forces and political partition were undoubtedly their initial goals, in later stages, especially
after international attention, it seems the siege served as a holding environment—a means to prevent foreign military intervention and to distract attention from their military operations and brutal ethnic cleansing campaign
carried out in rural Bosnia. It is clear, however, that failure to isolate and seal
the city of Sarajevo from outside support, most especially from international
humanitarian aid, contributed to the failure of the Serb siege.82 In fact, the
city and its defenders strengthened as the siege progressed.83
The importance of isolation is illustrated well by contrasting the failure
of isolation at Sarajevo with the Serbs’ effective isolation at the siege of Srebrenica, an effort now overshadowed by horrific criminal acts of genocide
that followed the siege. As early as 1993, Bosnian-Serb forces managed to
cut off Srebrenica from the rest of Bosnia.84 Only three UN relief convoys
entered Srebrenica in the first year of the conflict.85 Eventually, the Serbs
prohibited all humanitarian aid convoys in violation of a UN Security Council resolution.86 And while small groups managed to smuggle supplies
through the surrounding forested valleys, no major resupply or relief effort
reached the besieged Bosnian Muslims.87 The Serbs even blockaded support
to the UNPROFOR Dutch peacekeeping battalion stationed near Srebrenica, rendering it “nonoperational.”88
While the besieging Serbs never entirely eliminated smuggling and even
collusion by their own forces, effective physical and psychological isolation
contributed enormously to the fall of the city. The isolation of Srebrenica
was calculated and rigorously, if also ruthlessly, enforced. An order from the
Bosnian-Serb Supreme Command was clear, “create an unbearable situation

82. King, supra note 57, at 273 (noting Bosnian-Serb failure to seal the Sarajevo airport
and ground routes entering the besieged city).
83. BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 309–10.
84. Id. at 321.
85. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 139.
86. BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 323.
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 323.
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of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or relief for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa.”89 Bosnian Serb sieges of the Croatian cities of
Dubrovnik and Vukovar also featured comparatively complete physical isolation both geographically and militarily.90
The operational imperative of isolating enemy forces is not restricted to
conventional warfare. Recent studies suggest it is equally important to success against insurgent and other unconventional forces.91 Counterinsurgency
strategists increasingly appreciate the relevance, if not the appeal, of siege
operations. Noted counterinsurgency theorists have concluded, given urbanization and recent demographic trends, rural and remote areas will give way
to cities as the primary battlefields of insurgency.92 Rather than engage in
costly block-to-block or house-to-house combat to dislodge insurgents,
counterinsurgents may find sealing off insurgents a more attractive tactic of
urban warfare. Military officers have called for the U.S. armed forces to resurrect and revamp their encirclement doctrine and to emphasize its importance as a distinct form of offensive maneuver warfare—a call inspired
by recent counterinsurgency experiences.93
Historical experience is again instructive. In 2002, U.S. forces failed to
achieve complete physical isolation of encircled Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan’s Shahikot Valley, the failure
of which contributed to prolonging the armed conflict.94 In 2004, U.S. forces
laid siege to Fallujah, Iraq, to defeat newly formed insurgent forces.95 While
U.S. armor and infantry surrounded the city and even erected dirt berms to
prevent infiltration, those forces never achieved complete physical isolation.
89. Id. at 325 (citing evidence presented by the prosecutor at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia trial of General Krstić).
90. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 4.
91. See Scott Thomas, Operational Encirclements: Can the U.S. Military Decisively
Follow Through? 1–2 (May 21, 2009) (unpublished monograph, School of Advanced
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College),
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a506229.pdf. Thomas argues through historical
examples that U.S. military doctrine has relied on firepower in operational situations that
would have been better served by encirclement operations resulting in more thorough and
earlier defeats of enemy forces. See generally id.
92. See, e.g., DAVID KILCULLEN, OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF
THE URBAN GUERRILLA (2013).
93. Thomas, supra note 91, at 6.
94. Id. at 33–36.
95. DONALD P. WRIGHT & TIMOTHY R. REESE, ON POINT II: TRANSITION TO
THE NEW CAMPAIGN: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
MAY 2003–JANUARY 2005, at 38–39, 43–44 (2008).
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In response to mounting media pressure and with a view toward building
goodwill, the United States permitted humanitarian relief convoys to enter
Fallujah.96 Relief convoys and ambulances were discovered carrying ammunition, anti-aircraft guns, and other weapons.97 Rather than pursue effective
isolation, the United States abandoned the siege, transferring responsibility
to Iraqi units and emboldening the insurgents.
Several months later U.S. forces returned to Fallujah. While unable to
seal off smugglers entirely, a stronger effort at isolation preceded the final
assault of the city.98 This time humanitarian organizations and most media
were denied access. In addition, the use of force was far less constrained than
previously, with enormously destructive consequences on infrastructure. Yet
this second intensified effort in Fallujah achieved the military objectives unmet by the first.
Still, the Fallujah campaign revealed a perilous military paradox in counterinsurgency sieges. While siege tactics can avoid or delay the need for costly
and destructive urban assaults, the static and prolonged nature of sieges undermines a central tenet of counterinsurgency doctrine—winning the support of the civilian population. As one study notes, “a siege can lead to
strengthening the level of dependency and control a rebel group has on the
civilian population.”99 In particular, the study identifies smuggling and “aid
manipulation” as key contributors to the counterinsurgency siege paradox.100
Counterinsurgent forces are cautioned to avoid siege operations or to ensure
the strictest conditions of isolation to speed capitulation and break insurgent
control of civilian populations.101
Given the capacity of insurgent groups to blunt conventional forces’ advantages in resources and firepower, it is not surprising that siege conditions
96. Gerald De Lira Jr., The Anger of a Great Nation: Operation Vigilant Resolve
11 (May 4, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, United States Marine Corps, Command and
Staff
College,
Marine
Corps
University),
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509 044.pdf.
97. Pamela Constable, Marines Allowing Emergency Relief Supplies into City, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2004 (noting that Army military police discovered “antiaircraft guns hidden
in a cargo truck full of grain and grenade launchers hidden in ambulances” and “spotted
ambulances being used as getaway vehicles for gunmen and for collecting weapons after
street battles”).
98. WILLIAM KNARR & ROBERT CASTRO, THE BATTLE FOR FALLUJAH: AL FAJR—THE
MYTH BUSTER 57 (2009) (describing physical and electronic isolation of Fallujah preceding
attack).
99. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 80.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 81–82.
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have featured prominently in the current hostilities in Syria. Despite substantial aid from Russia, including significant air support, Syrian forces have experienced enormous difficulty dislodging rebel forces from urban areas, including neighborhoods in the capital city of Damascus. In Aleppo, escalation
of the Russian intervention ultimately facilitated full encirclement and capitulation of the rebel force in September 2015.102 The Syrian approach is frighteningly reminiscent of the Russian operation in Grozny. In February 2016,
the regime cut the rebel supply lines into Turkey and trapped nearly 300,000
civilians with the rebel force.103 The rebels capitulated in December after the
regime finally sustained its isolation of Eastern Aleppo from all outside support, including humanitarian aid.104 Only by resort to widespread indiscriminate aerial bombardments, but perhaps more importantly by perfecting their
encirclement and isolation of rebel forces in Aleppo, has the Syrian regime
been able to prevail tactically.
These, and many other historical accounts, confirm what has long been
understood about the military imperative of isolation during sieges. Absent
the military resources and will to prosecute costly and physically destructive
assaults against defending forces, siege operations require absolute isolation
of the besieged force. As military doctrine increasingly appreciates—and as
experience confirms—isolation must extend beyond physical isolation to include psychological and even electronic isolation. Even marginal compromise of any form of isolation reduces the chances of an effective siege. It is
clear that isolation stands paramount among military considerations in siege.
Just as it has been foremost in the planning and execution of successful siege
operations, isolation must be included in evaluations of how law can effectively regulate the conduct of siege. Thus, as the next Part demonstrates, it
is unsurprising that at the diplomatic conferences that have codified so much
of the law of war, States have jealously guarded their prerogative to control
access to besieged areas, retaining nearly unfettered discretion in all but the
narrowest circumstances.

102. Id. at 79.
103. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/55 (Aug. 11, 2016).
104. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 83.
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THE LAW OF WAR AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ACTIONS

The law of war applicable to the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello) incorporates two strains of regulation. A “Hague tradition” restrains targeting operations and the use of weapons by belligerents, while a “Geneva tradition”
regulates treatment of persons under the power of a belligerent during armed
conflict, including wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians.105 Jus in
bello restraints applicable to military operations that separate civilians from
support or find them intermingled with military objectives include rules from
both traditions.
Hague-tradition obligations applicable to attacks include duties to spare
certain civilian facilities and to mark buildings not used for military purposes.106 Article 51(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949
Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks “the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among civilians.”107 Further, Article 51(3) provides that direct
participation in hostilities, such as siege defense, deprives civilians of protection from targeting,108 while Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks109
and Article 51(5) prohibits the conflation of separate targets into a single
military objective.110
The most significant Hague-tradition provision relevant to encircled or
isolated civilians is found within Article 54 of AP I, as well as its customary
105. Neither tradition offers an especially accurate description of the geography of
treaty negotiation and law of war treaty conferences have rarely heeded the Hague-Geneva
bifurcation. Nor have the multilateral law of war treaties produced at these conferences
reliably confined themselves to their respective subject. Many law of war treaties include
both strains of regulation of the conduct of hostilities. See, e.g., Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land secs. II, I, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations] (addressing, respectively, targeting and weapons, and prisoner of war and treatment of the wounded and sick); Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts pts. IV, III, II, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (addressing, respectively, targeting and weapons, treatment of the wounded and sick, and prisoners
of war). Still, the two traditions remain a helpful organizing scheme for law of war study. At
a minimum, awareness of the Hague-Geneva bifurcation permits a measure of interpretive
and operational consistency within each tradition.
106. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 105, art. 27.
107. AP I, supra note 105, art. 51(2).
108. Id. art. 51(3).
109. Id. art. 51(4).
110. Id. art. 51(5).
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law incarnation.111 For States Parties to AP I, Article 54 prohibits “starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare.”112 While the law of war principle of
distinction generally prohibits attacks on civilians, Article 54 regulates beyond attacks, reaching methods of warfare short of attack.113 In this respect,
it adds an important extension of protections from the general conduct of
hostilities. Further, Article 54 prohibits destruction of “food-stuffs” and
other life-sustaining material “indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population.”114
Article 54 likely reflects customary international law; thus, it is binding
on non-States Parties to AP I.115 But this assessment should be acknowledged with caution. At present, the precise operational doctrine of the prohibition on civilian starvation is somewhat unclear. For instance, a broad
reading of Article 54 might suggest that even military operations that incidentally starve civilians are prohibited. Such a view might conclude that Article 54 requires belligerents to permit the evacuation of civilians incidentally
starved by military operations.
It is not difficult to appreciate how such a broad understanding of Article
54 would revolutionize the law applicable to encirclements and consequently
the military art of siege. Siege operations have long relied on entrapped civilians to contribute to the depletion of food stores and water that sustain
111. Id. art. 54; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 5.20, 17.9.2 (identifying a customary variant of the rule prohibiting starvation of civilians as a method of warfare).
112. AP I, supra note 105, art. 54.
113. See Zen Chang, Cyberwarfare and International Humanitarian Law, 9 CREIGHTON
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 29, 34–36 (2017) (examining the
jus in bello threshold of attack as a gateway for applying the rules of targeting).
114. AP I, supra note 105, art. 54.
115. The United States is not a party to AP I, however, its recent law of war manual
observes, “Starvation specifically directed against the enemy civilian population . . . is
prohibited.” DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, at § 5.20.1. The Manual cites
AP I, Article 54(1) as support. Id. § 5.20.1 n.711. An earlier U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
review of AP I characterized Article 54 as “a new rule.” Memorandum from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, app. 54–56, to Secretary of Defense (May 3, 1985),
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_
Staff/1985_JCSM_152-85_Review_of_GC_AP_I.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it acceptable, however,
observing “there is little military need for a modern armed force to retain the option of
starving the enemy’s civilian population into submission.” Memorandum from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, supra at app. 54.
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enemy forces to hasten capitulation.116 Complete physical isolation from outside support and sustenance is the defining feature of siege. Until recently,
legal guidance to some armed forces unequivocally authorized forcing civilians to share the resource-deprived fate of encircled enemy forces. For example, a 1956 U.S. law of war manual instructed that civilians fleeing sieges
may be fired on to force their return to the besieged area, although the 2016
DoD Law of War Manual expressly forbids the use of force to compel civilians to remain in besieged areas.117 The broad interpretation of Article 54
essentially compels besieging forces to alleviate starvation of not only civilians but also of trapped enemy forces. The latter will inevitably consume
supplies permitted to enter the besieged area or will be sustained by supplies
no longer consumed by civilians allowed to evacuate.
A competing view mitigates the compromised military advantage attendant to the broad view. It limits the prohibition on starvation as a method
of warfare to operations specifically directed at civilians.118 Under this view,
only military operations undertaken with the purpose of starving civilians are
prohibited. Military operations undertaken to starve enemy forces that incidentally starve civilians do not provoke Article 54 or applicable custom. This
view resorts instead to the law of war principle of proportionality to regulate
incidental starvation of civilians during siege. Only civilian starvation on a
scale that is clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage
of enemy defeat through encirclement and isolation from support or relief is
prohibited.119 Yet even this narrow interpretation of Article 54 and its customary equivalent, greatly limits the militarily essential task of physically isolating enemy forces from life-sustaining supplies when these forces are encircled along with civilians. Proportionality would prove an especially strong
limit on physical isolation when civilian presence is numerically significant in
relation to enemy military forces and objectives.120
116. See generally DAVIS, supra note 46 (recounting examples of besieging forces denying
civilian evacuation to hasten starvation and surrender).
117. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 44–45. That guidance was
supplanted by the 2015 DoD Law of War Manual, which expressly forbids the use of
force to compel civilians to remain in besieged areas. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 27, ¶ 5.19.4.1. The UK manual acknowledges forceful return of civilians to
besieged areas as an “older customary law practice,” but judges that practice obsolete
in light of AP I requirements. See UK LOAC MANUAL supra note 27, at 87 n.215.
118. See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, § 5.20.1.
119. Id.
120. For complete treatment of the issue of law of war provisions applicable to sieges,
see Sean Watts, Under Siege: International Humanitarian Law and Security Council Practice concerning
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Alongside Hague-tradition protections from methods of warfare and
their effects, the law of war includes significant Geneva-tradition protections
to civilians during siege and other operations that isolate civilian populations
from vital support. The law of war provisions addressed most directly to
humanitarian relief operations are found in the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949 (GC IV) and the first of two 1977 Protocols.121 These rules address
evacuation of civilian populations and access for humanitarian relief actions.
The Geneva tradition’s most significant contribution to the treatment of
isolated civilians may be Article 17 of the universally ratified GC IV. Article
17 addresses both evacuation of civilian populations and the delivery of humanitarian relief. With respect to removal and evacuation, Article 17 states
that parties “shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal
from besieged or encircled areas.”122 It is important to realize, however, that
the duty applies to limited classes of persons.123 In this respect, Article 17 is
something of an outlier to Part II of GC IV. As a general matter, Part II
applies to the entire civilian population, without regard to age, sex, or nationality.124 Yet Article 17 makes clear that it benefits only “wounded, sick,
infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases.”125 Thus, healthy
adult civilians who are not pregnant or aged are formally outside its ambit of
protection and may be compelled to remain in an encircled area by either the
besieged or the besieging force.

Urban Siege Operations (Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, Research
and Policy Paper, May 2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/2013/ 10/CHEProject-IHL-and-SC-Practice-concerning-Urban-Siege-Operations.pdf.
121. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; AP I, supra note 105; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereafter AP II]. The Geneva tradition also regulates situations of belligerent occupation.
Rules governing the treatment of civilian populations can be found in both the 1907 Hague
Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. The latter Convention includes relief
actions in favor of civilians in occupied territory, but its provisions are outside the limited
scope of this article. See GC IV, supra, arts. 59–62, 108–111.
122. GC IV, supra note 121, art. 17.
123. Id.
124. Id. art. 13 (“The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the
countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality,
religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.”)
(emphasis added).
125. Id. art. 17.
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The succeeding text of the Article 17 obligation further diminishes its
humanitarian effect. While it employs the imperative “shall,” the obligation
is merely to make attempts to agree to conditions under which the limited
class of persons protected by the Article may be removed. The parties are
not required to agree to removal or evacuation schemes but merely to endeavor to do so. The result is a limited obligation with respect to a narrow
class of besieged civilians.
Article 17 also addresses belligerents’ duties with respect to relief operations. Yet, perhaps predictably, these provisions are as limited and conditional as those addressing evacuation and removal. The narrow class of persons protected is identical; only wounded, sick, infirm, aged persons, children, and maternity cases benefit. Moreover, as with its provisions on evacuation, parties to a siege are only required to endeavor to permit relief supply
efforts. Crucially, and consistent with its limited scope and effect, the Article
refers only to permitting passage of “ministers of all religions,” “medical personnel,” and “medical equipment.”126 Food, water, and other life-sustaining
supplies are not within the ambit of Article 17.127
Article 23 of GC IV complements the narrow Article 17 relief provisions. Also appearing in Part II, Article 23 requires that States admit passage
of religious articles, medical supplies, and “foodstuffs, clothing, and tonics.”128 But like Article 17, Article 23 does not apply to all civilians, it applies
only when those consignments are intended for “children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.”129 Moreover, it lifts the obligation to
admit even these relief supplies when belligerents have “serious reasons for
fearing: (a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination, (b)
that the control may not be effective, or (c) that a definite advantage may
accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy.”130
Article 23 also permits belligerents to condition their consent to specified relief actions. It explicitly identifies supervision by a protecting power
as a control measure to prevent misuse by enemy forces.131 Furthermore, the
party granting permission may “prescribe the technical arrangements under
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 23.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (“The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in the
first paragraph of this Article may make such permission conditional on the distribution to
the persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of the Protecting
Powers.”).
21

International Law Studies

2019

which passage is allowed,” including the timing, duration, and scale of the
relief action.132
Several States later mitigated the limits of Article 23. For States Parties
to AP I, Article 70(1) protects civilians and guarantees relief much more
broadly in two important respects. First, it does not limit protection to any
sub-category of civilians; the entire civilian population enjoys protection.133
Second, it does not distinguish between forms of humanitarian relief or categories of supply. It only requires that relief efforts be “humanitarian and
impartial.”134
Still, Article 70(1) does not offer an unfettered guarantee of relief. It concludes with the language, “relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without distinction shall be undertaken, subject
to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.”135 Notably absent from
Article 70(1) is the Article 23 requirement that relief actions be permitted
absent “serious reasons” relating to abuse of access or misrouting of supplies.136 Consent of the belligerent parties appears to be a precondition to
deliveries of humanitarian relief under Article 70(1). The authority to withhold consent is unencumbered by the “serious reasons” limit of the Fourth
Convention. Non-States Parties to AP I, such as the United States, appear
to concur with the precondition of consent to humanitarian relief operations
as an aspect of custom.137 The logic of qualifying discretion to reject relief
actions under Article 23 of GC IV but not under Article 70(1) of AP I may
be questioned. Yet it appears States were only willing to abandon the GC IV
limited scope of relief and protected persons in exchange for discretion to
permit or reject these broader relief actions during siege.
The doctrinal upshot is a stunted—and for many—disappointingly inadequate rule system for humanitarian relief actions in armed conflict. Perhaps
as much as any subject of the law of war, the existing rules of relief actions
invite debate of the bargain struck between humanity and military necessity.
States’ military legal doctrine evinces concern for the harsh effects of denying relief actions. For example, the United Kingdom’s law of armed conflict
132. Id.
133. Article 70(1), in providing “children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and
nursing mothers,” retains priority of relief, and thus did not abandon the special categories
found within Article 23 of GC IVentirely. See AP I, supra note 105, art. 70(1).
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, § 5.19.2.
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manual instructs, “There is thus, except for those specific consignments covered by the convention [GC IV, Article 23], no duty to agree to them though
there is a duty to consider in good faith requests for relief operations.”138 Similarly, a privately produced law of war manual completed by the Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University advises,
“The majority of the Group of Experts were [sic] of the opinion that agreement by a Belligerent Party ought not to be withheld except for valid reasons.”139 Yet, as presently constituted, the law reserves extraordinarily broad
discretion to reject offers of aid and supports the enormous and historically
confirmed military import of imposing and maintaining isolation of enemy
forces during siege operations.
IV.

THE OXFORD GUIDANCE

In 2013, on directions from the UN Secretary-General, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) commissioned the Institute
for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and the Martin Programme on Human
Rights for Future Generations at Oxford University to host meetings of experts and to produce a report on the law governing humanitarian relief operations during armed conflict.140 The report was to focus on the narrow
issue of withholding consent to offers of impartial humanitarian relief during
armed conflict.141 The Oxford experts expanded the project into a broader
survey of how general public international law regulates humanitarian relief
operations during armed conflict.
In 2016, the authors delivered the Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict (Guidance).142 The
authors styled the Guidance as “a non-binding restatement of applicable

138. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, ¶ 9.12.3 (emphasis added).
139. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 228 (2010) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY] (emphasis added).
140. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 2–3.
141. Id.
142. The experts consulted did not agree with all of the conclusions of the Guidance.
Id. at 3. The two authors had written previously on the subject of law applicable to
humanitarian relief operations. See Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chara Gillard, Arbitrary
Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES 483 (2016).
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rules,”143 which “seeks to reflect existing law, and to clarify areas of uncertainty.”144 Its goals and approach are reminiscent of numerous recent legal
manuals and projects on other law-of-war subjects. Groups of private legal
experts, advocacy groups, and humanitarian organizations have produced restatements and interpretive guidance on a wide range of law of war topics,
including non-international armed conflict, cyber warfare, direct participation in hostilities, and precautions in attack.145 Although most of these products widely disclaim authority to make international law, many have proved
enormously influential on popular understandings of the law, lending clarity
and refinements to the stubbornly ambiguous work of States.
At its outset, the Guidance identifies the scope of humanitarian relief actions considered. It recounts an understanding of relief operations consistent
with familiar law of war provisions. Relevant relief operations include impartial efforts conducted without adverse distinction to provide “food, water,
medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, heating fuel, and other
supplies and related service essential for the survival of a civilian population,
as well as objects necessary for religious worship.”146
The Guidance then identifies an assortment of international legal bases
for States’ responsibility to meet the welfare and needs of civilians generally.
Purported sources of these obligations include sovereignty, and various
statements and guidelines issued by UN organizations, as well as widely ratified instruments of international human rights law.147 Significant attention
or analysis is not devoted to the differences between how these assorted
sources identify and describe belligerents’ responsibilities. The reader is left
unsure what remains of general requirements, such as that drawn from the
notion of sovereignty, in light of more specific requirements. Precisely how
143. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 3.
144. Id. at 8.
145. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009); MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY
(2006); HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 139.
146. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 8–9 (citing AP I, arts. 69–70; AP II,
arts. 18, 23; GC IV, art. 59). It may be noted, and it is acknowledged in the Guidance,
that AP I Article 70(1) permits relief operations to give priority to relief for children
and expectant mothers. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 9.
147. Id. at 11.
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obligations, such as those found in human rights instruments or the law of
war, interact with general obligations of public international law is unclear.
In particular, the Guidance’s authors do not indicate the precise adjustments
or accommodations made to general obligations to support civilians during
conditions of armed conflict. Accordingly, the general sources cited, and the
observations offered, seem ripe for misapplication or selective citation. In
this sense, the project may have been better served by the narrower law of
war-based mandate of OCHA and the Secretary-General.
The Guidance next addresses provisions of the law of war specifically applicable to humanitarian relief operations in armed conflict, stating first that,
as a general matter, consent of the belligerent parties is required to conduct
humanitarian relief operations.148 With respect to scope, the bilateral nature
of the consent requirement is emphasized; all “Parties concerned” must
agree for consent to be effective.149 The Guidance states that the consent requirement applies to the State on whose territory the operation will occur150
and to parties exercising effective control over foreign territory.151 It is noted
correctly, however, that consent is not required in cases of belligerent occupation or where humanitarian relief has been mandated by the UN Security
Council.152
Turning to the Geneva tradition, the Guidance provides Article 23 of GC
IV and Article 70 of AP I as the primary law of war sources applicable to
relief actions.153 It refers to an International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) assertion that both provisions reflect customary international law,
and are therefore binding on non-States Parties to the latter treaty.154 It is not
clear whether the authors shared this assessment; the Guidance merely states
these provisions “are considered customary.”155 Regardless, there is reason
to doubt the ICRC conclusion at least with respect to the views of the United
States. The 2016 U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual confines

148. Id. at 16 (citing AP I, art. 70(1)).
149. Id. (citing AP I, art. 70(1)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 18 (citing GC IV, art. 59 and assorted UN Security Council resolutions from
1991 through 2014).
153. Id. at 34.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 26 n.55, 31 n.64.
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its treatment of relief actions to the obligations of Article 23, with no mention of Article 70.156
The most important work of the authors, indeed the central query posed
to them from OCHA, involves the question of when belligerent parties may
withhold their consent to offers of humanitarian relief operations. Put
simply, the response of the Guidance is that belligerent parties may not arbitrarily withhold consent.157 It identifies three bases for the prohibition: “(i)
the need to provide an interpretation of the relevant treaty texts, which gives
effect to all aspects of those provisions; (ii) the drafting history of those provisions; and (iii) practice subsequent to the adoption of the treaties.”158
The first basis essentially maintains that a textual predicament compels a
prohibition on arbitrarily withheld consent. The use of the plural terms
“treaty texts” and “provisions” in the Guidance may suggest textual tension
arising from multiple sources. Yet, with respect to international armed conflict, the alleged textual difficulty does not arise between separate treaty regimes, as is sometimes the case with public international law. Nor does it
arise between separate law of war treaties, nor even between articles in a
single treaty.159 The authors of the Guidance allege the predicament arises
within a clause of a single article, namely Article 70(1) of AP I, which provides in relevant part, “[R]elief actions which are humanitarian and impartial
in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken,
subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.”160
The authors maintain that the Article 70(1) simultaneous resort to the
term “shall,” and the phrase “subject to the agreement of” provokes an interpretive quandary. It is asserted that to give legal effect to both terms, as
accepted canons of interpretation require, “shall” must be regarded as having
a limiting effect on the condition of agreement reserved in the latter clause

156. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, §§ 5.19.3, 5.19.3.1. The earlier
review of AP I by the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that AP I Article 70 was acceptable
subject to the understanding that relief actions could be refused due to “imperative
considerations of military necessity.” Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supra
note 115, at 72–73. That review also noted the president of the United States holds
statutory authority to withhold relief supplies that “endanger the Armed Forces of the
United States which are engaged in hostilities.” Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)).
157. OXFORD GUIDANCE, note 28, at 16, 20, 21,
158. Id. at 21.
159. The Guidance identifies a similar textual dilemma with respect to non-international
armed conflict arising from Article 18(2) of AP II. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
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of Article 70(1).161 They explain, “use of the word ‘shall’ . . . suggests that
acceptance of humanitarian relief is not entirely discretionary.”162 As understood in the Guidance, the term “shall” prevents parties from enjoying full
discretion when weighing whether to agree to a relief action or not.
A host of interpretive considerations calls into question whether this
reading is compelled or even correct. First, there is reason to wonder
whether the textual difficulty presented by Article 70(1) is overstated in the
Guidance. Other sources that have analyzed Article 70(1) have not dwelled on
or remarked significantly on any such internal tension. The quite thorough
analysis of an ICRC commentary on AP I does not explicitly identify any
such difficulty.163 Nor do military legal manuals of States, including States
Parties to AP I such as Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, identify
difficulty reconciling internal textual tension with respect to Article 70(1).164
States appear to have settled on a meaning that evinces neither concern for
textual tension nor compels the elaboration with respect to arbitrariness offered in the Guidance. In this respect, the Guidance appears something of a
“refusal of closure”—a wish to revisit an issue that is, from many appearances, settled.165
A second concern arises from the sequencing employed in the Guidance
to resolve the claimed textual predicament. The text “shall” and “subject to
the agreement of” appear in that order in Article 70(1).166 Yet the Guidance
reverses that order in its effort to interpret those terms, stating:
As already discussed, the last phrase makes clear that consent is required.
However, the use of the word “shall” also suggests that acceptance of humanitarian relief is not entirely discretionary. Interpreting the texts in a
161. Id. (citing the principle of effectiveness as exercised by the International Court of
Justice in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 70, ¶¶ 133–
34 (Apr. 1)).
162. Id. at 21.
163. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 2790–2822 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].
164. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (2001) [hereinafter CANADIAN LOAC MANUAL]; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (Germany), ZDV 15/2, LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter GERMAN LOAC MANUAL]; UK LOAC
MANUAL, supra note 27.
165. ROWAN WILLIAMS, ANGLICAN IDENTITIES 79 (2004).
166. AP I, supra note 105, art. 70(1).
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manner which insists on the requirement of consent, but which subjects
such consent to some limits, gives effect to both aspects of the provision.167

Note that the Guidance first indicates that Article 70(1) establishes a baseline rule that only consensual humanitarian relief is required. This is not itself
objectionable. However, the authors then seek to account for how the term
“shall” modifies the discretion to render or withhold consent. One supposes
that term might have been interpreted to eliminate parties’ discretion entirely
and the compulsory nature of the term suggests as much. Of course, such
an understanding would deprive the term “agreement” of its ordinary meaning. Thus, the meaning of “shall” is instead softened, regarding it as eliminating arbitrarily withheld consent. Considered in this sequence—that is, out
of the order in which the terms appear—the interpretation set forth in the
Guidance seems indeed a reasonable compromise or reconciliation of tension.168 However, neither “agreement” nor “shall” enjoys its full, plain meaning; each is simply accounted for in a manner that best fits that interpretation.
The authors of the Guidance adopted a reverse-order interpretation to
avoid rendering any part of the text redundant or meaningless.169 Reading
Article 70(1) non-sequentially might be commended or even necessary if a
natural sequential reading presented a difficulty with respect to redundancy
or rendered any text a nullity. But this is not the case with Article 70(1). A
simple, sequential reading and interpretation approaches the terms in precisely the order they appear and gives each term its full meaning. Under that
interpretation the term appearing first, in this case the term “shall,” establishes the Article’s general or baseline obligation. The compulsory nature of
“shall” indicates a mandatory character. The drafters of Article 70(1) did not
leave that term unmodified, however, as the phrase “subject to the agreement of” follows. A plain reading of “agreement” indicates discretion to
consent or not to consent is permitted. While the term “subject to” both
indicates that affirmative exercise of discretion is required and, more importantly, that any preceding obligations, including any obligations flowing
from the term “shall” are conditioned by agreement of the belligerent parties.
167. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21.
168. The authors introduce their non-sequential reading of Article 70(1) in an article addressing the subject of arbitrary withholding of consent. Akande & Gillard, supra
note 142, at 489. They explain, “While the last phrase makes clear that consent is required,
the use of the word ‘shall’ also suggests that acceptance of humanitarian relief is not entirely
discretionary.” Id.
169. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21.
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This natural reading does not, as the Guidance authors seem to fear, render the term “shall” a nullity. The compulsory meaning of the term is retained if one understands it to mean that the belligerent parties are required
to permit relief actions they have approved. That is, parties shall permit those
relief actions agreed to between themselves. By this reading, Article 70(1)
stands as a sort of guarantee that parties will permit humanitarian relief operations that they have considered to be consistent with the needs of their
military circumstances—a sense of pact sunt servanda with respect to humanitarian relief consent. Once a party determines it is willing and able to permit
a relief action in its territory or in territory under its effective control, it is
bound to support and to allow that action to proceed.
In fact, precisely this understanding of Article 70 appears in a later section of the Guidance where it is stated, “[o]nce consent has been granted,
parties to an armed conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded
passage of humanitarian relief supplies, equipment, and personnel throughout the territory under their effective control.”170 This same natural reading
of Article 70(1) appears again in the section concerning medical relief supplies, equipment, and personnel: “Accordingly, provided consent has been
granted, parties to an international armed conflict and other relevant states
have an absolute obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of medical relief supplies and equipment.”171
Rather than provoking textual tension that calls for a non-sequential interpretation and resulting obligation, the “shall” of Article 70(1) simply expresses and reinforces the binding nature of consent rendered to relief actions. Such a guarantee permits relief organizations to rely on the parties’
consent, to undertake preparations for these operations, and to execute these
actions during armed conflict. Meanwhile, by this reading, the phrase “subject to the agreement of” retains its essential meaning—that of involving
approval or acceptance and the imperative, mandatory meaning of “shall” is
simultaneously preserved.
Further doubt may be cast on the Guidance’s interpretation of Article
70(1) in light of its regulatory consequences. It is not only an overwrought,
non-sequential reading; it is a reading that identifies through implication, rather than through clearly expressed textual consent, a limit on State prerogative and therefore sovereignty. Withholding agreement to relief operations
inconsistent with the authors’ interpretation of Article 70(1) is regarded as
170. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). Later in the Guidance, the passage is reproduced without
the reference to territorial control. Id. at 29.
171. Id. at 34.
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an internationally wrongful act.172 Yet foundational precepts of international
law counsel against such analyses. In S.S. Lotus, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), predecessor of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), cautioned that restrictions on States must not be presumed.173 The
natural reading of Article 70(1) adheres more closely to the Court’s caution
in this respect. It avoids generating or implying a new restriction on States,
while giving full effect to each term of Article 70(1).
Finally, with respect to the text of Article 70(1), the interpretation offered
in the Guidance is a clumsy form for States to have expressed a requirement
not to arbitrarily withhold consent. It seems highly unlikely that drafters and
States expected consumers of Article 70(1) to apprehend such a requirement
through plain reading. Moreover, there are certainly simpler ways for States
to have expressed what the Guidance implies is there. Had States meant to
modify or limit their discretion to approve or disapprove relief operations,
they could easily have done so. In fact, they did so previously in Article 23
of GC IV with respect to medical and religious supplies for a narrow class
of civilians, conditioning refusal of such relief on “serious reasons” to suspect misuse. Article 23 explicitly requires the precise reasoned refusals that
the Guidance authors contrive for Article 70(1). States adopted an even clearer
obligation with respect to humanitarian relief for situations of belligerent occupation. Article 59 of GC IV indicates occupying powers “shall agree to
relief schemes on behalf of the [occupied] population.”174
As a second basis for the prohibition on arbitrary withholding of consent, the Guidance offers “the negotiating history of the Additional Protocols”—statements made by States’ representatives during debates at the diplomatic conference that formed Article 70(1). The Guidance asserts the States
party to those negotiations understood they would not have complete freedom to withhold consent and could only do so for valid reasons.175

172. Id. at 48 (“Unlawful impeding of humanitarian relief operations is a violation
of international humanitarian law and often also of international human rights law that
gives rise to responsibility under international law.”).
173. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). In a
similar vein, the Permanent Court of International Justice cautioned against interpreting broadly treaty provisions that limit State sovereignty. See JAMES CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (8th ed. 2012) (citing
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 1929
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 261 (Sept. 10).
174. GC IV, supra note 121, art. 59.
175. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21.
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Resort to negotiating history, or travaux préparatoires, to interpret treaties
is widely practiced, but it is best understood as a supplementary rather than
a primary means of interpretation. For instance, the ICJ does not consult
negotiating histories as a matter of routine. It limits resort to negotiating
histories to cases of pressing textual ambiguity or to instances where ordinary
meanings of treaty text give rise to unreasonable results.176 The ICJ has observed, “If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make
sense in their context, that is an end of the matter.”177 The Court has rejected
calls to consider negotiating history when natural or ordinary readings of
treaties render clear understandings.178
Because the Guidance chooses to create textual tension within Article
70(1), it is perhaps unsurprising that the authors resort to the negotiating
history of that Article as a means of interpretation. Whether, or the extent
to which, one accepts the negotiating history as appropriate to understanding
Article 70(1) is then a reflection of one’s opinion of the initial claim in the
Guidance that the Article is textually ambiguous.
The Guidance is not alone in resort to legislative records with respect to
Article 70(1). Like the Guidance, the ICRC’s Commentary on AP I relies on
negotiating history to interpret Article 70(1).179 Both the Guidance and the
ICRC Commentary emphasize a passage from the Official Records of the diplomatic conference by the German delegate Professor Michael Bothe: “[Article
70] did not imply that the Parties concerned had absolute and unlimited freedom to refuse their agreement to relief actions. A Party refusing its agreement must do so for valid reasons, not for arbitrary or capricious ones.”180
176. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. Article 32 states:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
. . . when the interpretation [in accordance with the ordinary meaning] . . . leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure . . . .”

Id.
177. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 8 (Mar. 3).
178. Id. (rejecting submissions calling on the Court to consider the negotiating history
where the Court found, “no difficulty in ascertaining the natural and ordinary meaning of
the words in question and no difficulty in giving effect to them.”).
179. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 163, ¶ 2805.
180. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21 (quoting 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA
1974–1977, at 336, ¶ 27 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS].
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However, Professor Bothe, who would later publish his own commentary
on AP I, and, incidentally, was a member of the group of experts that advised
the Guidance authors, appears to have conceded in his remarks that Article
70 did not limit discretion to reject aid to the extent he had hoped. He indicated that his delegation accepted the Article 70(1) passage requiring agreement of the belligerent parties, “in a spirit of compromise.”181
Other delegations endorsed the German view, including the United
States, Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, but none
was willing to insist on treaty language to that effect.182 The Swiss representative also indicated his delegation preferred to delete the phrase “subject to
the agreement of the Parties.”183 Presumably, it was the unfettered discretion
to withhold consent indicated by the unqualified term “agreement” that concerned the Swiss. Yet the Swiss delegation ultimately declined to insist on or
propose any such measure. And although the meeting considered and
adopted other amendments to what became Article 70(1), no State offered
any amendment to incorporate Professor Bothe’s understanding or the Swiss
preference into the text of the Article. Nor did any State submit an understanding to the effect of the German statement upon ratification.
Further examination of the AP I Official Records and earlier records reveals
a still more complicated negotiating history. An earlier draft, negotiated at a
conference of experts that preceded the diplomatic conference, obliged belligerent parties to accept relief actions “to the fullest extent possible.”184 A
subsequent draft, considered at a second conference of experts, actually
dropped the qualifying phrase entirely, expressing an absolute duty, commensurate with the duty attendant to situations of belligerent occupation. It
required States accept relief actions and only gave belligerents discretion to
prescribe technical arrangements such as timing.185 Yet at the succeeding diplomatic conference, States rejected both arrangements.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 1 REPORT ON THE WORK
OF THE CONFERENCE, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE
IN ARMED CONFLICTS, SECOND SESSION, 3 MAY – 3 JUNE 1972, at 161 (1972) (reproducing Draft Article 64 and recording experts’ reactions thereto).
185. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949: COMMENTARY 78
(1973) (reproducing Draft Article 62 concerning relief actions).
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As late as 1976, the third year of the four-year diplomatic conference,
the draft of Article 70(1) included an unqualified duty to accept humanitarian
relief. For example, the 1973 draft additional protocol prepared by the ICRC
and submitted to the diplomatic conference read in relevant part: “the Parties
to the conflict shall agree to and facilitate those relief actions which are exclusively humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any
adverse distinction.”186 And after a first round of amendments by States, that
portion of the draft article read: “each party to the conflict shall agree to, and
shall facilitate relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character
and conducted exclusively for the civilian population without any adverse
distinction.”187
However, States ultimately insisted that the general obligation to permit
relief actions be contingent on agreement by the belligerent parties. A working group assigned to address the draft humanitarian relief articles reported
a split among delegations. Some delegations advocated a “clearly defined obligation with respect to relief.”188 Others maintained “such an obligation
could not be imposed.”189 The working group reported that to reconcile
these views, the draft of Article 70 was “re-worded to state that relief actions
should be carried out in accordance with agreements concluded between the
Parties . . . .”190 The result was the condition of agreement in the final version
of Article 70(1).
If one is to concede the propriety of resorting to travaux préparatoires, selective citations should usually be avoided. A fuller consideration of the
travaux reveals that the selection of the authors of both the ICRC Commentary
and the Guidance underemphasize the importance to the majority of assembled States of preserving sovereign prerogative during armed conflict and
specifically during siege.
The third basis for a prohibition on arbitrary withholding of consent
concerns “practice subsequent to the adoption of the treaties.”191 The Guid-

186. 1 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 180, pt. III, at 20.
187. Amendments to Draft Protocol I, Article 62, in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
180, at 282–83. The co-sponsors of this amended version included Austria, Canada,
Demark, Finland, France, Greece, Holy See, Indonesia, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. See id.
188. 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 180, at 333 (reporting on Working Group B of
Committee III at the Fourth Session of the Diplomatic Conference).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21.
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ance asserts “subsequent formulations of the rules of humanitarian assistance” expressly indicate States may not arbitrarily withhold consent.192 It is
true that accepted rules of treaty interpretation include subsequent practice
as evidence of meaning.193 Usually, such practice is confined to evidence of
actual application of the treaty obligation in question.
To the author’s credit, the Guidance refers to “practice,” not to State practice, presumably so as not to overstate its significance to the formation of
custom. Accordingly, it directs readers to an Institute of International Law
resolution, a draft article on disasters by the International Law Commission,
and various statements by UN organs, including non-binding observations
of the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the Human Rights
Committee. None of these sources, of course, constitutes subsequent State
practice. Rather, the sources cited in the Guidance are, like the Guidance itself,
pronouncements by private or international organizations and their organs,
many addressing situations outside armed conflict. And on closer examination, none of these sources relies in any significant respect on rigorous or
systematic effort to discern consistent and substantially uniform State practice that might inform or modify the meaning of any treaty. Accordingly, the
subsequent practice offered in the Guidance provides thin, if any, primary evidence of application of States’ international obligations with respect to relief
actions during armed conflict.
A more orthodox case might have been made concerning subsequent
practice by resorting to select States’ military legal manuals. The Canadian
manual on the law of armed conflict observes, “The parties to a conflict are
obliged to facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments,
equipment and personnel.”194 Yet on closer examination, it is clear that this
passage describes the duty with respect to vulnerable classes of the civilian
population set forth in Article 23 of GC IV. The passage includes no citation
to Article 70 of AP I, although Canada is a State Party to that instrument.195
The German manual on the law of armed conflict instructs, “States through
which relief supplies are moved may object to the transit for objective reasons only.”196 However, this passage seems more clearly directed to the case
of transit territorial States not party to the conflict than to belligerents. The
preceding passage confirms as much, addressing obligations of “a Party to a
192. Id. at 22.
193. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 176, art. 31(3)(b).
194. CANADIAN LOAC MANUAL, supra note 164, at ¶ 614.7.
195. Id.
196. GERMAN LOAC MANUAL, supra note 164, at ¶ 526.
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conflict” and emphasizing deliveries are “subject to the agreement of the
Parties.”197 The German distinction between the duty of territorial transit
States and that of belligerents involved in armed conflict is not clear from
the law. It may, however, be premised on the comparatively minimal burden
and risk presented to mere transit States not involved in operations to compel an enemy force into submission.
After the case is made for a prohibition on arbitrary withholding of consent to humanitarian relief operations, the Guidance offers three indications
of arbitrariness for purposes of Article 70(1) when consent is withheld: “(i)
in circumstances that result in the violation by a state of its obligations under
international law with respect to the civilian population in question; (ii) [that]
violates the principles of necessity and proportionality; (iii) that is unreasonable, unjust, lacking in predictability, or that is otherwise inappropriate.”198
The first indication of arbitrariness points chiefly to other law of war
provisions, including the prohibition of starvation as a method of war, parties’ medical treatment obligations, and the prohibition on collective punishment.199 It also calls for examination of obligations outside the law of war.
The Guidance states that the internationally wrongful act of arbitrarily withholding consent to relief operations occurs when doing so violates human
rights obligations such as bodily integrity, economic, cultural, and social
rights, and an adequate standard of living.200
A complicated and contentious body of scholarship and State practice
has developed around the fraught question of how international human
rights and the law of war interact during armed conflict.201 However, substantial agreement has formed around the notion that, although armed conflict does not extinguish human rights obligations, human rights provisions
197. Id.
198. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 22.
199. Id. at 23.
200. Id. It is reasonable to assume this provision with respect to arbitrariness is
intended to apply to other international obligations outside the law of war such as those
derived from sovereignty and other general international law provisions. See id. at 11.
201. See Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 657, 662–65
(Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014) (cataloging a wide range of viewpoints on
the interface between international human rights law and the law of war); David
Kretzmer, Rotem Giladi & Yuval Shany, International Humanitarian Law and International
Human Rights Law: Exploring Parallel Application, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 306 (2007)
(introducing several papers presented at a conference addressing the interface between
human rights and the law of war published in the same volume).
35

International Law Studies

2019

yield to or are informed by more specific regulation by the law of war—the
doctrine of lex specialis.202 The ICJ applied lex specialis considerations when it
evaluated claims that nuclear weapon use might constitute a violation of the
human right against the arbitrary deprivation of life.203 The Court advised
that, during armed conflict, what constitutes an arbitrary deprival of life for
human rights purposes should be determined by reference to the law of war,
specifically the principles of discrimination and humanity.204
Like the ICJ, the Guidance authors attempt to reconcile how human rights
and law of war rules might operate in a complementary fashion during armed
conflict. Specifically, they attempt to account simultaneously for how human
rights law and the law of war guarantee human survival and sustenance during siege. But whether by error, or by a clever turn, the comment on arbitrariness departs from the ICJ’s application of the doctrine of lex specialis.
Where the Court, acknowledging the law of war as law specifically crafted
for armed conflict, sought to understand a human right through, or by reference to, the law of war, the Guidance does precisely the opposite. In the
Guidance, the authors seek to discern the extent of a law of war provision by
reference to assorted human rights norms. More precisely, it is asserted that
arbitrariness, for purposes of the law of war applicable to relief actions, is
determined by reference to human rights law obligations with respect to bodily integrity, economic, cultural, and social rights, and a standard of living.
Where the ICJ limited and qualified a human right by reference to the law of
war, the Guidance authors expand a law of war prohibition by reference to
human rights law.
The approach in the Guidance to lex specialis not only reverses the application of that doctrine, it also presents a strained narrative of the relationship
between human rights law and law of war applicable to relief actions. Article
70(1), adopted subsequent to each of the referenced human rights norms, presumably reflects States’ judgment that hostilities introduce considerations
202. See David Glazier, Zora Colakovic, Alexandra Gonzalez & Zacharias
Tripodes, Failing Our Troops: A Critical Assessment of the Department of Defense Law of War
Manual, 42 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215, 262–63 (2017) (concurring
with application of lex specialis, however, contesting the United States’ broad conception
of the doctrine); Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
648, 655–56 (2007) (discussing various approaches to the operation of the doctrine of
lex specialis).
203. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (8 July).
204. Id.
36

Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege

Vol. 95

not accounted for in peacetime regulation of access to humanitarian relief.
Had the preexisting human rights rules cited in the Guidance been applicable
to armed conflict and considered adequate, there would have been little call
for Article 70(1). Yet, the Guidance has the effect of leveling out the international regulation of relief access in times of peace and times of armed conflict. It effectively incorporates these human rights norms by reference in a
way that Article 70(1) might have, but clearly did not. A sounder approach
accepts States’ apparent judgment that conditions of armed conflict warrant
greater discretion for States’ decisions to accept or reject offers of relief and
require a specific regime of regulation apart from general, chiefly peacetime
obligations.
The second indication of arbitrariness in the Guidance refers to the principles of necessity and proportionality. It is not entirely clear whether this is
meant to refer to law of war principles or principles of general public international law. Necessity and proportionality are expressed in a variety of international legal regimes.205 The possibility of reference to principles of general public international law is at least suggested by a citation to a UN Human
Rights Committee communication and a UN Secretary-General report on
human rights and deprivation of nationality.206 Blurring somewhat the distinction between the two principles, it is explained that withheld consent that
“exceeds what is necessary in the circumstances . . . is thus disproportionate,”207 which, in the view of the Guidance authors, amounts to prohibited
arbitrariness.
It is widely understood that law of war principles convey specific meaning. For example, the law of war principle of necessity has been defined to
permit

205. See Attila Tanzi, Necessity, State of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Feb. 2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1071 (describing the legal doctrine of necessity
under State responsibility); see also Emily Crawford, Proportionality, in supra, (May 2011),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e14 59 (describing a “general principle” of proportionality that exists
within public international law).
206. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 24 n.52 (citing A v. Australia, Comm.
No. 560/1993, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993
(Apr. 30, 1997); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013)).
207. Id. at 24.
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a state engaged in armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force,
not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in
order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete
or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.208

Meanwhile, law of war proportionality includes at least two and perhaps as
many as three meanings. The U.S. Law of War Manual indicates that proportionality “may be defined as the principle that even where one is justified in
acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive.”209 While
the German Law of Armed Conflict Manual defines a narrower notion of proportionality applicable to attacks: “attacks on military objectives which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination of these, which and would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated are prohibited.”210
Each of these meanings, but most especially the jus in bello variant of
proportionality applicable to attacks, has been refined to account for the
unique challenges and circumstances of armed conflict. Even if the Guidance
is understood as confining an indication of arbitrariness to the law of war
principles of necessity and proportionality, it is unclear why the law of war
should be interpreted to include a separate legal obligation with respect to
arbitrariness when it comes to humanitarian relief. It is especially unclear
why the interpretation offered in the Guidance should be employed to identify
a redundant norm. To be sure, too much should not be made of this observation. The law of war is rife with specific regulations that implement, refine,
or give effect to law of war principles. But evidence of such obligations and
their acceptance by States should be overwhelmingly clear rather than implied through interpretive dexterity.
The third indication of prohibited arbitrariness identified in the Guidance
includes withheld consent that is “unreasonable or that may lead to injustice
or to lack of predictability, or that is otherwise inappropriate.”211 This passage gives rise to at least two concerns. First, it is difficult to evaluate justice
and predictability as law of war requirements. No law of war instrument
208. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, ¶ 2.2; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 27, § 2.2 nn.13–15 (offering military necessity definitions from military legal
manuals, judgments of tribunals, and scholarly work).
209. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, § 2.4.
210. GERMAN LOAC MANUAL, supra note 164, ¶ 404.
211. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 25.
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elaborates on either as a general requirement of the conduct of belligerents
during hostilities. Nor do the military legal manuals of States or other widely
consulted sources include significant treatment of justice and predictability
as either independent law of war obligations or as bellwethers of sound law
of war implementation.
Second, the Guidance does not elaborate on either concept and only surmises, “a total failure to provide reasons for withholding consent,” as a possible example of arbitrariness for purposes of Article 70(1).212 It is troubling
to equate belligerent parties’ silence on military decision making with arbitrariness. A number of considerations, other than arbitrariness of reasoning
can explain failure to provide public explanations of military courses of action. The intense pace and changing nature of battlefield conditions often
prevent belligerents from regularly offering timely and cogent explanations
for their conduct. Belligerents face notorious challenges even coordinating
decisions internally and suffer routine failures in this respect, despite best
efforts and enormous incentives to improve. These challenges are multiplied
and exacerbated with respect to their external communications. It is also well
understood that military planning and execution require secrecy to guarantee
operational security. And although many armed forces include public affairs
organizations, the military organizations that are most privy to the rationales
for decisions are rarely the primary outlets for communicating States’ dayto-day legal positions.
Further, there is textually-based cause to doubt the requirement set forth
in the Guidance that parties must provide reasons for withholding consent.
To apply the concern expressed by the authors for the doctrine of effectiveness,213 a distinction should be made between the text of Article 23 of GC
IV and Article 70(1) of AP I. As noted above, where the latter is silent as to
reasoning for withholding consent, the former explicitly requires “serious
reasons,” thus limiting conditions under which belligerents may reject relief.214 To imply a reasoning requirement in AP I, where none appears, arguably renders the Article 23 requirement a nullity. That AP I supplements the
1949 Geneva Conventions commends all the more interpreting it with a view
to consistency with those Conventions.215
The requirement of reasoned refusal raises further concerns of a practical nature. This concern is borne out especially by the following conclusion
212. Id.
213. Id. at 21 n.38 (citing the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat).
214. See supra text accompanying note 130.
215. See AP I, supra note 105, art. 1(3).
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from the Guidance: “Withholding consent without providing any reasons
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of arbitrariness.”216 Rebuttal presumptions are familiar and widely accepted in the controlled environment of litigation. However, they have proved controversial in law of war instruments—often for good reason. The burden shifting schemes associated with
presumptions and their rebuttal by evidence, while manageable in civil and
ordinary criminal litigation, prove enormously difficult in the chaotic atmosphere and aftermath of combat operations. Requiring parties to record and
publish their reasons for refusing relief actions introduces a new burden on
belligerent parties—likely a cost not anticipated at the time these obligations
were negotiated. And it is unclear why the party refusing agreement to a relief
action should bear the burden of rebuttal rather than requiring the party alleging an unlawful impediment to make a prima facie showing.
Other evidentiary concerns attend the arbitrariness prohibition. It is possible that the standard for refusal of consent was not specified by States because States realized that proof of arbitrariness would be too difficult to enforce. There is a further question whether the refinements in the Guidance
with respect to arbitrariness merely shift debate from the straightforward
question of consent to the more complicated and convoluted question of
adequacy of reasoning and sufficiency of proof.
In most cases, the conclusion that a party had arbitrarily withheld its
consent only could be determined based on the totality of circumstances.
Military decisionmaking, viewed from an outside or non-indoctrinated perspective, might often seem arbitrary. Further, military planning and decision
making frequently involve judgments made with imperfect or inadequate information. Relevant circumstances would certainly include observable battlefield conditions. Yet just as relevant—and perhaps even more so—would
be facts not available either to opposing parties or the public.
Finally, an evaluation of the Guidance requires broader consideration of
its place in and impact on the development and methodology of the law of
war. While States have made important progress in humanizing war through
law, that law remains in important respects incomplete. It is rife with seeming
gaps in protection and in logic. Experience in war repeatedly highlights the
humanitarian deficiencies of the law of war. Whether these gaps or failings
represent invitations to achieve through interpretation and logic what could
not be accomplished in negotiations between States or whether they are
merely reflections of the limits of international consensus and therefore of
216. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 25.
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the prevailing balance between humanity and necessity is a critical consideration for any law of war analysis.
At the end of the nineteenth century and into the opening decades of
the twentieth, the law of war experienced a brief golden age of codification.
Beginning with a flurry of succinct treaties addressing discrete jus in bello subjects, States regulated the initiation, conduct, and termination of hostilities
between themselves.217 Their enthusiasm for codification, and also it seems
for compliance with the international law of war, soon waned. Neither two
world wars nor endless internal armed conflicts in the mid-twentieth century
managed to inspire States to develop a comprehensive international law of
war. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and UN Charter certainly reflect important commitments to international law by States, each prompted in large
part by States’ experience in armed conflict.218 Yet the Geneva Conventions
and the UN Charter left important aspects of the conduct of hostilities and
resort to force either untreated or underdeveloped.
The closing decades of the twentieth century saw something of a resurgence in codification, perhaps even a second, albeit lethargic and sporadic,
golden age. In addition to robust updates to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
the period between 1972 and 2000 saw new jus in bello treaties on targeting

217. See Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539; 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 105; [Hague]
Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S.
No. 538; [Hague] Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 187
Consol. T.S. 459, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT
157 (1907); [Hague] Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 187
Consol. T.S. 453, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT,
supra, at 155; [Geneva] Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885, 202 Consol. T.S. 144; [Hague]
Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S.
No. 538; [Hague] Convention (II) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; [St. Petersburg] Declaration Renouncing the Use, in
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868,
138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 474; [Geneva] Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22,
1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361.
218. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
GC I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; GC IV, supra note 121; U.N. Charter.
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and conventional weapons, as well as underappreciated law of war codifications in the form of war crimes treaties.219
But in the opening decades of the twenty-first century, international legal
momentum again seems to have stalled. The ICRC, long an initiator of law
of war development, presently does not have public plans to sponsor a comprehensive law of war treaty conference. Currently, its most significant legal
project is an effort to update and reissue its previous commentaries on the
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols.220 Meanwhile, States’
219. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of
an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261; Protocol [V] [to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] on
Explosive Remnants of War, Nov. 28, 2003, 2399 U.N.T.S. 100; Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Protocol [II amended] [to the Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May
1996, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93; Protocol [IV] [to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct.
13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
S.C. Res. 955 annex (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1598
(1994); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-General Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan.
13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol [III] [to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980,
1342 U.N.T.S. 171; Protocol [II] [to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; Protocol
[I] [to the Convention on Prohibitions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects]
on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; AP I, supra note 105;
AP II, supra note 121.
220. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Bringing the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and
Their Additional Protocols into the Twenty-first Century, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 1551 (2012).
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diplomatic attention is chiefly invested in narrow weapons issues. 221 Yet,
State support for these contentious regulatory efforts is far short of the universal support enjoyed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
If law of war development can be described as fitful, the same cannot be
said for its subject. Rapid evolutions and even revolutions in warfare have
been a constant.222 New means, methods, and venues of warfare emerge with
regularity. Science and military art continually push conflict in new directions
and even into new domains.
The challenge of pairing static law with dynamic conditions of combat is
not new. But during hiatuses in law of war development, such as the present,
these efforts gain increased importance. Lulls in treaty development involve
law of war implementation less as a matter of application and more as a matter of interpretation. The effort, such as that undertaken by the legal experts
who participated in the preparation of the Guidance, to identify precise rules
of conduct for emerging conditions in war becomes more difficult as they
grow removed in time and context from the law.223 While law of war principles such as distinction and humanity are in some senses timeless, assessing
precisely what rules of conduct each principle demands in a new domain or
context of warfare or from new military technology is no simple matter.
Alongside efforts to form operative law for conditions of armed conflict,
law of war implementation has involved a second, perhaps more subtle endeavor—an effort to reconcile that operative law to the fundamental purposes of the law of war. Law of war analyses, such as the Oxford Guidance,
reveal not only their authors’ preferences and habits of interpretation, they
also offer veiled (and not-so veiled) comments on the suitability of the law
of war—how well or poorly the extant law vindicates its purposes. That is,
law of war interpretation involves both assessments of how the law applies
to new conduct in war, as well as appraisals of how well resulting rules of
conduct match prevailing senses of humanity and military necessity.

221. See United Nations Office at Geneva, Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems in the CCW, UNOG, https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/
8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).
222. See generally MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR: THE MOST
RADICAL REINTERPRETATION OF ARMED CONFLICT SINCE CLAUSEWITZ (1991); THE
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY (Peter Paret ed., 1986).
223. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE 248–56 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (encountering particular difficulty
applying early twentieth-century rule of neutrality to cyber operations during armed
conflict).
43

International Law Studies

2019

The law of war is widely understood to reflect a balance between these
often competing considerations.224 Thus, each new law of war treaty and
each amendment, but also each interpretive gloss, private report, manual, or
guidance subtly alters the humanity-military necessity balance. And just as
State understandings of law of war rules evolve, so too the desired point of
balance between humanity and military necessity shifts over time. The results
that States, their armed forces, international tribunals, academia, humanitarian organizations, and civil society expect from the law of war change with
the character of war, but also in response to current senses of morality and
public conscience.225 Law of war literature—whether legal manuals, judgments, publications, reports, or even protests—from any of these constituencies reflects not only doctrinal assessments, but also normative assessments of an appropriate balance between humanity and military necessity.
Just how greatly military operations can or should be curtailed in the name
of humanity, and just how much human suffering should be tolerated to
achieve military objectives is a central—though often latent—debate within
and between competing law of war works.
If law of war interpretation involves both analysis to discern operative
law, as well as to reflect the humanity-military necessity balance, the Guidance
is a commendable effort to focus attention on a fundamental purpose of the
law—to preserve a measure of humanity even in the desperate and dangerous conditions of combat. Despite presenting problematic issues of interpretation, the Guidance remains a compelling argument for incorporating humanitarian interests into the law of war.
However, the Guidance seems based on a narrow or incomplete understanding of the purposes of the law of war. Its interpretive effort skews almost exclusively to humanitarian concerns at the expense of considerations
of military experience and practice. There is no evidence of concerted effort
to consult or incorporate military doctrine or the rich historical experience
of siege operations or, for that matter, other military operations that involve
isolation. Similarly, the Guidance includes no assessment of the impact its interpretation would have on military operations.
224. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795
(2010).
225. While the nature of war is in many respects constant, the character of war is
ever changing—it is determined by policy, technology, and other social phenomena.
See COLIN S. GRAY, MODERN STRATEGY 125 (1999). See generally COLIN S. GRAY,
CLAUSEWITZ, HISTORY, AND THE FUTURE STRATEGIC WORLD (2003).
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The Guidance is, at its heart, a subtle attempt to renegotiate the boundaries of the law in the name of humanitarianism. It identifies in the law a
concealed plea to humanitarian logic previously unappreciated by States or
by two generations of law of war scholarship. The Guidance reflects an attempt to accomplish something not found in interpretation but rather in the
slow, difficult work of diplomacy and drafting. Undoubtedly with good intentions, the Guidance authors refine the law to a greater extent than States
apparently wished. But whether specificity is actually desirable should be
considered carefully. Ambiguity, while vexing to jurists and academics, is often an essential aspect of international regulation. In some cases, ambiguity
reflects important limits of consensus among States. Unclear or seemingly
incomplete rules are often compelling evidence of what separates States’
views on a subject. Unclear rules can also reflect States’ judgment that more
precise or logically consistent rules would prove legally unmanageable.
But more than an exercise in a priori humanitarian interpretation, the
Guidance should be appreciated as an alteration in the balance between humanity and military necessity. The law of war reflects balancing points established with respect to discreet issues and battlefield circumstances. For example, nearly absolute protection for hospitals reflects States’ judgment that
humanity should prevail over all but the most compelling military necessity.226 Likewise, the previously described limits on a State’s right to reject
offers of humanitarian relief for children and expecting mothers found in
Article 23 of GC IV reflects an instance of humanity prevailing over the
military imperative of isolation.
The law of war also involves a meta-balance—an aggregate balancing
point at which humanity and necessity are comparatively served by the law
of war writ large. Various periods of the law of war attest to different balancing points. The early law of war took relatively little account of humanitarian interests. Entire categories of victims of war were left unprotected and
military necessity in targeting was nearly unconstrained. The twentieth century saw States accept greater and greater limits on their conduct in armed
conflict in the name of humanity. An empirical assessment of the relative
weight presently accorded to humanity and military necessity is difficult to
identify but nonetheless, one can certainly discern movement in favor of
humanity.
It may be too much to say that the Guidance significantly alters this metabalance. But extrapolation of its interpretive sleights of hand and its resort
226. GC I, supra note 218, art. 19.
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to humanitarian logic to other law of war subjects and debates could quickly
do so. The law of war balance would surely be altered if each law of war
ambiguity were resolved exclusively by resort to humanitarian objects or purposes, without equal attention to military necessity as reflected by historical
experience and military doctrine. Those preparing the Guidance appear to
have been unhappy with the prevailing law of war balance with respect to
offers of humanitarian relief. It undoubtedly shifts the bargain struck by
States with respect to humanitarian relief operations in favor of humanity.
The effort that produced the Guidance might have more useful as a project to consult with States to identify the potential for treaty amendments. In
particular, a better accounting for the military equities and imperatives of
siege might have guided the authors to a sounder interpretation from both
doctrinal and normative perspectives. Furthermore, such an approach might
have expressed and achieved desirable doctrinal and normative unity on a
subject of critical importance. It is perhaps underappreciated in this period
of prolific law of war scholarship and interpretation that each dissent, each
new view, each fragmentation undermines the law of war as something,
sometimes the only thing, which unifies opposing parties. Seeking consensus
informed by humanity, as well as military necessity, rather than pushing the
boundaries of humanitarian logic, seems a far more promising means to advance humanity.
In sum, the authors of the Guidance employed a wide range of sophisticated interpretative techniques to identify an obligation on the part of States
not to arbitrarily withhold consent to relief actions during armed conflict.
Casual readers may find it a compelling account of international law. Even
experienced jurists and law of war practitioners may find its analysis persuasive. Yet, on careful examination, each of its three interpretive arguments
suffers difficulty. Its textual construction of Article 70(1) unnecessarily complicates a passage that is clear and settled in its meaning. It then bootstraps
that engineered ambiguity to justify resort to a narrow segment of negotiating history that excludes extensive debates and drafts inconsistent with its
conclusion. Finally, the Oxford Guidance offers subsequent practice drawn not
from comprehensive surveys of State practice, but rather from similar efforts
by like-minded non-State actors to bolster its findings. The result is an attractive appeal to humanitarian logic, but a nonetheless strained interpretation of States’ obligations to accept relief actions during armed conflict. Certainly, no nefarious motive should be attributed to its authors; rather the
Guidance seems a product of dogged attention to humanitarian interests and
logic to the neglect of the military imperatives of its important subject.
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CONCLUSION

In September 1782, unable to maintain effective isolation of Gibraltar, Spanish forces joined by French troops, abandoned hopes of starving out the
British garrison. On September 8, they launched their “Grand Assault,” mustering nearly 50,000 fresh soldiers to the defenders’ 5,000, who were selfdescribed as “feeble as old age for want of succour . . . including sick,
wounded, and disabled.”227 Still, the garrison withstood and returned each
bombardment, inflicting particularly costly damage to the blockading fleet’s
seaborne artillery barges.228 By October 12, a British fleet under the command of Admiral Howe arrived, providing reinforcements and distracting
the Spanish ships from their bombardment.229 On February 2, 1783, the new
French commander Duke de Crillon ceased hostilities. Although the siege
featured fierce and desperate combat, failure to prevent the delivery of relief
supplies is credited as the leading cause of the siege’s failure.230
The Gibraltar siege, like nearly all sieges before and since, is a heartwrenching tale of human torment. This tragic story of suffering and many
others like it have inspired notable efforts by States to codify limits on the
conduct of siege. Yet judged from a humanitarian perspective, the law of war
applicable to sieges, and especially to offers of humanitarian relief, includes
glaring logical flaws and gaps. The urge to correct these flaws or to fill these
gaps, especially by resort to humanitarian logic and interpretation is compelling, and in some respects, admirable. The Oxford Guidance is an understandable effort to close these gaps by resort to a range of legal interpretive methods, each guided by a compelling humanitarian logic.
Still, law of war development has never been exclusively an exercise in
humanitarian logic. Whatever success the law has had at humanizing the conduct of war is attributable at least in part to efforts to account for the realities
of armed conflict and to incorporate military imperatives and equities. With
respect to siege operations, no military consideration is clearer than the absolute imperative of imposing complete physical, psychological, and electronic isolation. What may appear to some as inadequacies of the law regulating relief actions, including discretion to reject offers of impartial humanitarian relief, may actually be reflections of States’ armed forces’ considerable
227. ANCELL supra note 6, at 252–53.
228. Id. at 266–76.
229. Id. at 279–82.
230. RENÉ CHARTRAND & PATRICE COURCELLE, GIBRALTAR 1779–1783: THE GREAT
SIEGE 27 (2006).
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military experience with siege. Discretion to withhold consent to offers of
humanitarian relief actions is an entirely logical, if potentially cruel, outgrowth of the isolation imperative and operational experience. It is worth
considering, contrary to the views expressed in the Guidance, that the presently permissive rules for withholding consent to relief actions reflect not
inadequacies but rather the presently-operative balance between humanity
and military necessity.
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